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: Case No. 20020673-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT TODD BOVO 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction of Disorderly Conduct, a 
class C misdemeanor in violation of section 76-6-45 of the Utah Code, and 
Reckless Driving a class B misdemeanor in violation of section 41-6-45 of 
the Utah Code in the Fourth District Court, State of Utah, Utah County, 
Orem Department, the Honorable John Backlund, Judge presiding. 
TODD BOVO 
Defendant Pro Se 
300 West 745 South 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801)735-8510 
Pro Se Defendant/Appellant 
Robert Church 
Orem City Prosecutor 
City Attorney's Office 
56 North State Street 
Orem, Utah 84058 
r 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee u ^ -
MY* 
Paute&fr 
Clerk of ttr^C*>t»7t 
ARGUMENT 
This reply brief will follow the order of arguments in the Brief of 
Appellee. Critical parts of the trial record are included in the Appellant's 
reply brief. 
Issue I: THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL. 
This court should find that Mr. Bovo made adequate trial motions for 
the request for a trial by jury. According to Rule 12 (a) of U.R.C.P., a 
motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing 
unless the court otherwise permits. Is the arraignment not a hearing? Mr. 
Bovo motioned on the record at the arraignment for a jury and the City 
contends that the motion never occurred (appellee brief p.7). Under this 
argument the City is stating that anything that transpires inside the 
courtroom is moot unless an action is in writing prior to the proceeding. If 
that is true then that would mean that the judge had no jurisdiction. 
The language used by the trial judge clearly indicated that the charges 
would be amended to infractions. "So this would be tried as if they were 
both infractions, then.'Xarraignment p.6) It cannot be ignored that the 
defendant was told the charges would be amended by the trial judge and 
there would be absolutely no possibility of being convicted of the 
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misdemeanor crimes, or serving jail time. The judge also stated, "I haven't 
put anybody in jail for reckless driving in 18 years"(arraignment p.5). But 
the defendant was sentenced to six months in jail. Although the sentence of 
six months in jail was not fully served the judgement should not trump itself 
because the jail time served was not totaling six months. The indirect 
consequences of the sentence still affect the defendant. 
The city argues that the court never relieved the defendant with 
compliance to Rule 17(d). However the court itself failed to comply with 
the rule. When the judge ordered that the charges be amended then and only 
then would the defendant have been legally denied a trial by j ury. In plain 
doctrine the rule states "No jury should be allowed in the trial of an 
infraction (Rule 17[d]). The charges were never amended to infractions. 
The City acknowledges that the defendant was proceeding pro se, and 
the defendant accepted the responsible to comply with the rules of the court 
and criminal procedure. In spite of this information pro se defendants 
should not be held up to recognize the lower court's own set of 
abbreviations. The defendant had complied with calendar dates to his 
appearance. He prepared pre-trial motions and addressed the court 
respectfully and courteously. He just wanted his day in court. He wanted 
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the opportunity to present his case in his own defense. After the arraignment 
the defendant had been given an information sheet. At the bottom of the 
information the abbreviations NJT were hand written by the court clerk. The 
defendant assumed and according to his requests that July 19, 2002 was the 
date of the pre-trial hearing. The defendant asked the court clerk outside the 
court if the writing at the bottom of the information sheet-"HEARING 
SCHEDULE IN OPEN COURT: NJT."(addendum A) meant a pre-trial 
hearing. She told him it did mean a pre-trial hearing. Once again the 
defendant acknowledges his limited legal knowledge and resources, but the 
defendant should not be held up to the court's own abbreviations. Had the 
abbreviation been written in full plain English-such to say- nonjury trial- the 
defendant would have been able to come prepared for a trial and not a pre-
trial hearing. Mr. Bovo motioned for an enlargement of time because of this 
discrepancy but his motion was denied (trial p.8). 
Issue II THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CHARGES. AND 
THE APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL. 
The City argues that there is harmless discrepancies of the testimony 
offered by the City's witnesses that the defendant mouthed "you're going to 
pay" (trial p.14) vs. "you'll pay" (trial p.38). It is imperative to note that the 
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defendant was charged with a misdemeanor from this one alleged 
"Mouthing." One phrase that was neither seen nor hear by either officer on 
scene, (trial p. 68). It is not a harmless discrepancy to charge and arrest a 
person with a misdemeanor crime without the evidence necessary to hold the 
defendant up to the charges. The defendant was not asked to desist in either 
action. Because of this discrepancy the rights of the defendant were severly 
compromised. 
Furthermore it must be noted that the City contends that it is the 
responsibility of the defendant to present every scrap of competent evidence 
to support the verdict. However the defendant was unable to present the 
facts to his defense. In the City's opening brief the City further recognizes 
that the trial was obviously biased. The City contends that Mr. Bovo 
"ignored the instruction and continued his line of questioning in the manner 
which was improper and objected to by the prosecutor "(appeellee brief 
p. 12). 
MR. BOVO: Did you see other units pass by the scene? 
O. BINGHAM: It is possible that other units drove by. However, 
they did not stop. That's of no consequence. 
MR. BOVO: Did you see other units pass by? 
MS. JENSEN: Objection 
THE COURT: Sustained 
(trial p.64) 
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The City argues that this was a proper objection to a question already 
asked and answered that the Judge properly sustained. Officer Bingham 
never answered the question. He said that, "it is possible." But that did not 
answer Mr. Bovo's question of whether he saw other units drive by. Mr. 
Bovo wasn't asking if, "it was possible." Mr. Bovo, having never been 
involved with law enforcement, felt swooped down by a force of at least six 
officers. This was an intimidating show of force. The City also listed the 
following testimony in the opening brief. 
MR. BOVO: Have you ever fabricated information to— 
MS. JENSEN: Objection 
THE COURT: Sustained 
Once again the City challenges that this was a proper objection 
because the defendant had no good faith basis that the officer had ever 
fabricated information, and that the question was not relevant. However, as 
shown in the trial transcript the Officer admitted to a "misrepresentation" 
from the very first question Mr. Bovo asked him (trial p.56). 
MR. BOVO: In your report you stated that you were patrolling 400 
South and observed a green Honda. Was there two Hondas at the scene? 
O. BINGHAM: No, there was not. 
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MR. BOVO: So was the Honda that I was driving the green Honda 
that you observed? 
O. BINGHAM: What portion of the report does it say that? 
MR. BOVO: At the very beginning on the third, fourth line. 
O.BINGHAM: Fourth paragraph? 
MR. BOVO: Fourth line of the first paragraph. 
O. BINGHAM: Oh, I'm sorry. There was only one Honda. 
MR. BOVO: So it wasn't the green Honda, it was the blue Honda? 
O. BINGHAM: That would be correct. 
MR. BOVO: So it's jus a mis— 
O. BINGHAM: It was a misrepresentation. 
The Officer reported multiple mistakes as listed above, but Mr. Bovo 
wasn't allowed to question the officer as to points that were very 
consequential. Observing the correct vehicle in a reckless driving charge is 
vital. The line of questioning was not allowed by the Court. The response 
of the judge was as follows: 
MR. BOVO: I just want to make sure. 
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THE COURT: No, I just want to make sure. Is this the way the trial 
is going to go? I mean, you're going over points that are not very 
consequential, are they? 
MR. BOVO: I think observing them— 
THE COURT: I mean it's obvious to me in your questioning of the 
witnesses you don't dispute that you were involved in something with this 
young lady. You have your version and she has hers. But now you want to 
spend about ten minutes questioning the officer about the license place on 
your car. So if you want to just tell me. I need to know, is this the way this 
trial is going to go? 
MR. BOVO: Absolutely not. My line of questioning is, according to 
state and federal law, in order to stop a vehicle in a n infraction it needs to be 
witnessed. I'm trying to find out what the officer had witnessed it. (trial 
p.58). 
As illustrated Mr. Bovo had good reason to believe that information 
was enhanced, or frabricated, because of the inconsistencies with what 
transpired and his report, as well as the report of Officer Healy. Once again 
Mr. Bovo did not abuse his court privileges and was expedient in his 
questioning, but was denied all the same. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bovo's trial and pre-trial objections and motions furnish amply 
basis to reach the pre-motive requirements discussed in the Appellant 
opening brief and in the reply brief. If this court finds inadequate motions 
and objections were made on these points, the pre-motive issue should be 
ruled on pursuant to the doctrine of plain error. 
The errors the trial court made during the trial were harmful in that it 
improperly bolstered the City's witnesses, which provided a powerful tool 
against the appellant in key points. There is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for Mr. Bovo absent the errors presented by City, and 
the trial Court. 
As the Appellant's pre-trial Motion To Dismiss stated, this is a person 
with no previous criminal history with a clean driving record. The Appellant 
is not asking for clemency, only that the judicial system defend his civil 
rights. Mr. Bovo has no previous legal training or education and has crafted 
these briefs through his own intensive research. He would be willing to 
testify at oral argument if so needed. In the light of the foregoing, and for 
the reasons set forth in these briefs, Mr. Bovo respectfully requests this court 
to reverse and remand to the trial court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this bO day of May, 2003 k
)DD FTBOVO 
Defendant Pro Se/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, TODD F. BOVO, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered 
eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to Robert J. 
Church 56 North State Street, Orem Utah 84057, this Co day of 
May, 2003 
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TODD FRANK BOVO, 
DEFENDANT 
CASE No. 025204324 TC 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Todd F. Bovo charges should be dismissed based on the totality of the 
circumstances. The government has charged the defendant in violation of Section 41-6-45 
Reckless driving. This charge is clearly wrong because this is a subjective offense, based 
on the discretion of the citing officer, and not based on hearsay evidence. Only when a 
police officer observes a violation of a misdemeanor (or an infraction) is he or she 
empowered to make an arrest, People v. Superior Court! Cal.3d. 186,200 (1972). The 
alleged offenses were observed solely by the complainant, and no officer witnessed a 
single moving violation. Such a case can be made in the event of personal injury or 
property damage, however, neither occurred in this situation. Todd was also charged 
under Section 76-9-102, Utah Code Annotated (1973), Disorderly Conduct. However, 
subsection 76-9-102 (3) states, "disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the 
offense continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction." No 
person requested the defendant to desist. Also, the arresting officer failed to ascertain 
whether the offense was committed in his presence, so as to justify a warrantless arrest. 
The officer did not observe the alleged offense through the use of any of his own senses, 
and based his findings on that of the witness on scene. Although probable cause is 
justified in felony charges, misdemeanor "probably cause" or "probable suspicion" exists 
when the facts and circumstances are observed by the officer through the officer's senses 
and are sufficient to warrant an officer of reasonable caution to believe that an offense is 
occurring. Also, the government failed to comply with Miranda v. Arizona, 344 U.S. 436 
(1966). All statements should be suppressed because of the violation of the Fifth 
Amendment Due to the preponderance and lack of credible evidence both charges should 
be dismissed. 
DECLARATION 
1. Todd F. Bovo is the defendant in the above-entitled action. 
2. At about 18:45 hours, April 6,2002, Defendant was stopped at 100 North after being 
followed by officers for approximately a mile. 
3. While driving, he was accompanied by my brother ADAM A. BOVO who would have 
been able to testify on my behalf to the alleged incident, however, he is currently 
employed as a forest firefighter on a "Hot Shot" crew and is unable to be contacted due to 
the remote locations where he works. Also, riding as a passenger was TROY L. BOVO, 
army first class, and UVSC student. Lastly, Zesty, a pure-bred-yellow-Labrador was 
being carried in the vehicle. Zesty is owned by Guide Dogs for the Blind in San Rafel 
California. Todd is a volunteer in the program to train Zesty of the basic commands to 
guide a blind person. At the time of the incident Zesty was wearing her identifying green 
jacket as she always does whenever she accompanies him in public places. 
4. At the time of the traffic stop the defendant was ordered out of the vehicle because 
officers believed he may try to flee the stop. This was not a one-officer arrest He was 
swooped down upon by a combined team of at least six officers. This intimidating team 
came armed not only with guns, but also with other signs of power. This defendant, for 
whom there is no indication of prior experience with police or with the criminal justice 
system was held incommunicado at which time he was subjected to isolation, 
interrogation, alternating threats, by confrontational abusive officers. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Argument 
Defendant argues that both the evidence and the statements relating to the charges should 
be dismissed under the totality of the circumstances. 
I. RECKLESS DRIVING, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-45 of the 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), which the City of Orem has adopted by Section 19-1-1, in 
that, the defendant did drive a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
persons or property. The most serious of all driving-related misdemeanors. Reckless 
driving is covered in one of the most worded statues in the Vehicle Code. This offense is 
a "discretionary arrest" misdemeanor, based on the observations of the citing officer. 
The misdemeanor arrest rule in Utah provides that a police officer may make a 
warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor offense if the misdemeanor is committed in the 
officer's presence. This rule does not apply when a motor vehicle accident has occurred. 
No accident or injury occurred in this situation. The purpose of the presence 
requirement is to prevent warrantless arrests based on information from third parties. 
State v. Jensen, 351 N. W. 2d 29 (Minn. App. 1984). In ascertaining whether an offense 
is being committed in an officer's presence, the officer may take into account what the 
officer observes through use of any of his or her senses. State v. Forsythe 194 W.Va. 
496,460 S.E.2d 194,197-98 Ct App 1985). The officer is not limited to his sense of 
vision alone, i.e., it is not necessary for the officer to have actually seen every fact 
constituting the commission of the misdemeanor, but he may utilize all of his 
senses... .thus a misdemeanor is committed in the presence of an officer when, with the 
aid of all his senses and what is common knowledge under the circumstances, the officer 
has knowledge that such is the case, Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1 e, at 
23-24 (3d.ed. 1996). Not only must the officer perceive through his or her senses that an 
offense is being committed, but the officer must also have a reasonable ground to infer 
that the suspect is committing an unlawfiil act to meet the probable cause requirement 
Probable cause to justify a misdemeanor arrest exists when the facts and circumstances as 
observed by the officer through the officer's senses are sufficient to warrant an officer of 
reasonable caution to believe that an offense is occurring. Warren, 103 N. M. at 475-76, 
709 P2& at 197*98. (noting use of officer's "sensory perceptions" to meet the "in 
presence" requirement). Although, Officer Bingham witnessed the defendant vehicle 
travel approximately one mile, he did not witness a single moving violation, infraction or 
misdemeanor, nor did any other Orem City Police Officer. Thus, the stop which Officer 
Bingham made was an investigatory stop; therefore, probable cause for stopping is the 
issue, and Officer Bingham had no "probable cause" witnessed in his presence to warrant 
an investigatory stop. Lastly, this charge is incorrect because two of the alleged moving 
violations are not found under Title 41, chapter six as the law states, "following another 
vehicle—safe distance, does not apply to vehicle speeds of less than 35 miles per hour." 
The witness testified in her statement that she was traveling 25 miles an hour and the 
defendant was behind her the whole time. Defendant argues a lack of reasonable 
grounds to stop him. Where there are unreasonable grounds supporting a warrantless 
arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor, the arrest is not valid, and is therefore a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure. 
II. Defendant argues that both his statements and the evidence relating to the charges 
should be suppressed under Miranda, under 18 USCS §3501 (c). Miranda requires (1) 
that before interrogation, the person in custody must be informed clearly that he has the 
right to remain silent and that anything he says will be used against him in court; (2) that 
the person in custody must be informed clearly of the right to consult with a lawyer and 
have one present during interrogation; and (3) that a lawyer will be appointed for the 
person in custody if he is not able to afford to pay a lawyer. The District Attorney 
acknowledges that Defendant was not informed of his right to remain silent until after his 
statements. A Police officer does not have to give me a Miranda warning if he stops 
someone for a traffic violation so long as the police officer simply asks a motorist for 
identification and limits discussion to the traffic offense for which the officer stopped the 
motorist. A motorist's statement to a police officer relating to events leading up to a 
ticket is therefore admissible even if the officer did not give the motorist the Miranda 
warning. However, a Miranda warning would be required if an officer detains a motorist 
in order to question the motorist about crimes unrelated to the traffic stop. Officer 
Healey was stated he was talking with the complaintant to investigate the defendant 
contacting her in the future, with harassment or threats. 
Without Miranda or §3501, the court would look at the totality of the circumstances as in 
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963). In the case before the court today, Mr. 
Todd F. Bovo is a man with no previous history with the criminal justice system. He did 
sound his horn and flash his lights to another motorist who was driving well below the 
speed limit while talking on her cell phone and she was clearly not paying attention to 
driving her vehicle. He did not violate any driving rules. Upon being dispatched officers 
surrounded the defendant with numerous officers, whereas the defendant was isolated and 
threatened. The arresting Officer Healy stated, "I am going to teach you a lesson because 
you are messing with the wrong cop-1 win every time." Also, "I don't care who you are I 
can ruin your day if I want to." 
Further while §3501 (c) applies, §3501 itself should not trump Miranda as the 
government argues. Miranda set out as a matter of Constitutional law the procedure that 
must be followed for a confession to be held valid. Both the majority and the dissent 
(Clark) agree that the decision in Miranda rests on the Fifth Amendment. For the 
majority, Chief Justice Warren wrote, 
"We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of 
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused or crime contains 
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's 
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do 
so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his rights and the 
exercise for those rights must be fully honored." Miranda v. Arizona, 344 
U. S. 436,~(1966). 
The court would be advised to look at the words of U.S. Attorney Janet Reno and 
Solicitor General Seth Waxman: "Because the Miranda decision is of constitional 
dimension, Congress may not legislate a contrary rule unless the Court was to overrule 
Miranda We submit that principals of stare decisis do not favor the overruling of 
Miranda, and we do not request the Court to take that step. In the thirty-six years since 
that decision was handed down, it has become embedded in the law and defined thru the 
decisions of this Court. If Miranda were to be overruled, this Court [the Supreme Court] 
would have to disavow a long line of its cases..." This is from the Brief for the United 
States, filed Feb. 28,2000, in the case ofDickerson v. United Stated, No. 99-5525, page 
9. 
To date no United States Attorney General has argued that Miranda is not the law of the 
land. Congress does not have the power to overrule a Supreme Court opinion. That is 
why §3501 has been ignored since its passage two years after Miranda. 
Defendant argues that he was charged under Section 76-9-102, Utah Code Annotated 
(1973), Disorderly Conduct. However subsection 76-9-102 (3) states, disorderly conduct 
is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues after a request by a person to desist 
Otherwise it is an infraction." No person requested the Defendant to desist, the officer 
nor the witness. Furthermore, this alleged offense was "mouthed", meaning that all 
parties, complainant and the officers, did not hear anything. Only the complainant stated 
that she saw the defendant mouth a threat. Officer Healy and Officer Bingham did not 
hear or see any threatening behavior by the defendant. Thus, once again the arresting 
officer based his findings on a third party for an infraction, not even a misdemeanor. 
Under Section 77-17-3 the defendant argues that there is not sufficient evidence to put a 
defendant to his defense, therefore, the court should order him discharged. Proving that 
the defendant "mouthed" a comment beyond a reasonable doubt is impossible. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant in this case has worked as a Paramedic/Firefighter for the past five 
years. His duties included responding to local emergencies while operating an 
ambulance. Also, this time last year he provided emergency care for one of the 
largest correctional facilities in the State of California. He worked with law officers 
on a daily basis without incident, ever. He returned to Utah on a leave of absence to 
finish class work at BYU. While in Utah he encountered Officer Healy who 
presented himself very unprofessionally. He was confrontational, disrespectful, 
threatening, and rude. Officer Healy has a history of overbearing force, and 
demonstrated his character during this incident. 
For the reasons set forth above, the court should be ordered to dismiss the matter 
rather than try the defendant. The evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. It 
would not be in the interest of justice to prolong these matters. 
DATED: JULY 2,2002 Respectfully submitted, 
Tod^om/u^ndant in Pro Per 
